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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-2a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the jury err in finding that Seller performed all

steps necessary to forfeit Buyer's interest in the contract?
Standard of Reviews A jury finding will be reversed on
appeal only if "the evidence to support the [jury's]
verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable
and unjust." Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P. 2d 730, 732 (Utah
1982) .
Issue Preserved:
Motion for New Trial (Record
[hereafter, "R."] 1146-1147.)
2.

Did the jury err in finding that Buyer's filing of a

notice of interest violated the Wrongful Lien statute?
Standard of Review: Same as Issue #1.
Issue Preserved: Same as Issue #1.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
U.C.A. § 38-9-1, Liability of Person Filing Wrongful Lien:
A person who claims an interest in, or a lien or
encumbrance against, real property, who causes or has
caused a document asserting that claim to be recorded or
filed in the office of the county recorder, who knows or
has reason to know that the document is forged,
groundless, or contains a material misstatement or false
claim, is liable to the owner or title-holder for $1,000
or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and
for reasonable attorney fees, and costs as proved in this
chapter, if he willfully refuses to release or correct
such document of record within 20 days from the date of
written request from the owner or beneficial title-holder
of the real property. This chapter is not intended to be
applicable to mechanics7 or materialmen's liens.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case

This is a contract dispute between the Seller and Buyer of 16
acres

of

undeveloped

land

in

Sandy,

Utah.

When

appellant

Commercial Investment Corporation ("Buyer") did not make a payment
due under the purchase contract, appellee Don Siggard and Glenna F.
Siggard Family Trust ("Seller") sought to forfeit Buyer 7 s interest
by sending a notice of default and, 28 days later, a notice of
forfeiture.
Buyer is appealing because the notice of forfeiture was two
days premature.

Pursuant to the purchase contract, Buyer should

have been given 30 days after it received notice of default to
cure.

Although Seller was immediately made aware that the notice

of forfeiture was premature, Seller has never given Buyer any
additional time in which to make the required payment.
Buyer seeks a ruling that because the notice of forfeiture was
two days premature, Seller failed to terminate Buyer's rights under
the contract.

Buyer also seeks a ruling from this Court that by

filing a notice of interest against the property, Buyer did not
violate Utah's Wrongful Lien statute, U.C.A. § 38-9-1 et seq.
2.

Course of Proceedings

The case was tried to a jury.

The evidence at trial included

testimony and exhibits showing that the notice of forfeiture was
two days premature.

The jury was instructed that a seller may not

forfeit a buyer's interest under a real estate contract unless the
seller

strictly

complies

with

the
2

notice

provisions

of the

contract.

(R. 1012, Addendum [hereafter, "Add."] 43.)

Despite

this instruction, the jury found that Seller performed all steps
necessary to forfeit Buyer's interest in the contract.

(R. 1024,

Add. 46.)
The jury was also instructed as to the elements of a cause of
action for a wrongful lien, U.C.A. § 38-9-1.

(R. 1016-1017.) The

jury found that Buyer's filing of a notice of interest violated the
Wrongful Lien statute.

(R. 1024, Add. 46.)

Based upon the jury's findings, the trial court entered
judgment for the Seller, ruling that the contract was null and
void; that Buyer's interest in the property was forfeited; and
assessing attorney's fees against Buyer based on a provision in the
Wrongful Lien statute that permits an owner who proves wrongful
lien to recover their attorney fees incurred in doing so.

(R.

1066-1067, Add. 50-51.)
Buyer filed a timely motion for a new trial on the issues of
(1) whether Seller performed all steps necessary to forfeit Buyer's
interest under the contract and (2) whether Buyer's filing of a
notice of interest violated the Wrongful Lien statute.

(R. 1146-

1156, 1222-1231.)
3.

Disposition in Court Below

The trial court denied Buyer's motion for a new trial (R.
1288-1290), and this appeal followed.

(R. 1302-1304.)

STATEMENT OF PACTS
The property
defendant

Don

in question

Siggard

and

is undeveloped

Glenna
3

F.

Siggard

land

owned

Family

by

Trust

("Seller").

(R. 888, Add. 29.)

Seller, had
locations.
15.)

developed

Don Siggard, a trustee of the

three residential

subdivisions

in other

(Trial Transcript [hereafter, "Tr."] 442:3-5, 455:13-

As part of his development work, Mr. Siggard had obtained

surveys, had

created

site plans,

and had

been

in

charge

of
2

completing all other tasks necessary to develop the subdivisions.
(Tr. 455:8-10, 458:1-4, 460-467, 467:16-21.)
Mr. Siggard was a licensed contractor for about 40 years.
(Tr. 435:21-23, 436:19-20.)

He also had, at different times in his

life, a real estate license (Tr. 437:4-7, 438:3-24) and understood
the use of various real estate documents, including uniform real
estate contracts.

(Tr. 439-440.)

Because of his background, Mr. Siggard understood the high
costs and risk involved in developing raw ground.

He knew that a

developer can make money when the market is right or lose money
when the market is not right.

(Tr. 471:22-25, 472:1-13.)

The property in question is located within a 38-acre parcel.
In 1988, this parcel had a value of approximately $25,000 per acre
The site plans, which required the assistance of an engineer
or architect, showed the location of proposed streets, sewer lines,
water lines, gas lines, culverts, underground cabling, alleys, and
easements. (Tr. 458-459; 467:16-21.)
2
For example, he obtained necessary approvals for sewer and
culinary water; resolved surface and subsurface water issues;
obtained utility and land drainage easements; obtained title
reports; obtained necessary financing; hired engineers and
surveyors;
functioned
as
the
general
contractor;
hired
subcontractors to put in sewer and water lines, curb, and gutter;
paid fees to the city and the appropriate utilities; applied for
building permits; worked with flood control people; and was
familiar with the city ordinances relating to the foregoing. (Tr.
460-467; 467:16-21.)
4

for residential use.
435:1-3.)

(Tr. 378:24-25, 379:1-9; cf. Tr. 434:11-25,

Commercial Investment Corporation ("Buyer") wanted to

purchase 20 acres within the 38-acre parcel.

(R. 888, Add. 29.)

Buyer planned to do all the work necessary to have the property
rezoned for commercial development; to obtain necessary site plan
approval;

and

property.
47:7-9,

eventually

to build

a

shopping

center

on the

(Tr. 24:17-25, 26:20-25, 27:1-2, 39:20-21, 46:21-24,
50:18-21,

substantially

115:8.)

increase

313:17-20, 632:24-25.)

The

commercial

the property's

value.

rezoning

would

(Tr. 28:12-20,

Estimates of the increased value due to

commercial zoning ranged from $98,000 to $180,000 per acre.

(Tr.

313:17-2 0, 632:24-25.)
The purchase contract was signed by the parties on August 31,
1988.

(Trial Exhibit 7.)

pages 1-14.)
as

(A copy is included in the Addendum at

The contract describes the property being purchased

"approximately

20 acres of real property

(the 'Property')

located at the southeast corner of 11400 South 1000 East" in Sandy,
Utah, "which property is part of" the 38-acre parcel.
f 1, Trial Exhibit 7, Add. 1.)

(Contract,

The contract gives Buyer "the

exclusive right" to designate its 20 acres anywhere within the 38acre parcel.
503:3-25.)

(Contract, f 1, Trial Exhibit 7, Add. 1; Tr. 50:1-4,
In Buyer's applications to Sandy City for commercial

zoning, Buyer requested zoning at the corner of 11400 South and
1000 East.

(E.g., Trial Exhibit 9; Tr. 216:22-25, 217:1-2.)

5

Later, by mutual agreement of Buyer and Seller, the number of
acres to be purchased was reduced from 20 to 16.

(Trial Exhibit

17; Tr. 147:10-16, 148:19-22.)
Buyer spent substantial time and money in seeking a rezoning
of the property.

Mr. Robert Busch, president of Buyer, testified

that Buyer's costs in doing so were approximately $200,000.
134:10-25, 135:1.)

(Tr.

Eventually, Sandy City approved the rezoning.

(Tr. 133:13-19.)
The purchase contract has a very specific provision as to
forfeiture.
keep

It allows Seller, in the event of Buyer's default, to

Buyer's prior payments under

the

contract

as

liquidated

damages and to be free from all obligations to convey the property
to Buyer.

(Contract, f 18.A, Trial Exhibit 7, Add. 4-5.)

To

exercise this forfeiture provision, however, Seller must provide
both a notice of default giving Buyer 30 days from its receipt of
the notice to cure the default, followed by a notice of forfeiture.
The contract states:
Sellers shall give Buyer written notice specifically
stating: (1) the Buyer's default(s); (2) that Buyer shall
have thirty (30) days from its receipt of such written
notice within which to cure the default(s), which cure
shall include payment of Sellers' costs and reasonable
attorney's fees; and (3) Sellers' intent to elect this
remedy if the Buyer does not cure the default(s) within
thirty (30) days.
Should Buyer fail to cure such
default(s) within thirty (30) days, then Sellers shall
give to Buyer another written notice informing Buyer of
his failure to cure the default (s) and of Sellers'
election of this remedy.
[Contract, f 18.A. (emphasis
added).]
The contract requires annual interest payments of $56,000
beginning on March 3, 1989.

(Contract, f 2.A, Trial Exhibit 7,
6

Add. 2.)

The first payment, however, was contingent on Buyer

receiving commercial

zoning, i.e.,

if Buyer failed to receive

commercial zoning prior to March 3, 1989, the contract was void.
(Contract, f 16.)

The parties amended the contract to remove this

contingency (Trial Exhibit 17; Tr. 150:5-10), at which time Buyer
made the first payment.

(Tr. 398-400.)

On March 3, 1990, Buyer / s second payment of $56,000 was due.
Buyer did not make this payment.

(Tr. 409-410.)

Mr. Busch

testified that the reason Buyer did not make this payment was
because of a disagreement between him and Mr. Siggard over a survey
required by the contract and because of a demand by Mr. Siggard
that Buyer buy more ground.

(Tr. 167:20-21.)

Thereafter, the

following events transpired:
March 5, 1990

-

Don Siggard, for Seller, sent a notice of
default dated March
mail.
in

5, 1990 by

certified

The notice described Buyer's default

paying

the

second

annual

payment

of

$56,000 and then stated, "Buyer has thirty
days from receipt of this notice to cure the
default."

(Tr.

162:1-8,

410-411;

Exhibit 20 (emphasis added).)

Trial

(A copy of

this notice is included in the Addendum at
page 15.)

7

March 6, 1990

-

Robert Busch, for Buyer, received the notice
of default.

(Pretrial Order, Uncontroverted

Fact (o), R. 890, Add. 31.3)
April 2, 1990

-

Don

Siggard

sent

a

notice

of

forfeiture

dated April 3, 1990 by certified mail.

The

notice stated in part, "Since, the default
notified in the first letter mailed March 5,
1990 was not cured, receipt of this letter
releases seller of all obligations to the
original contract with [Buyer] dated August
31, 1988."

(Tr. 412:6-7; Trial Exhibit 21.)

(A copy of this notice is also included in
the Addendum at page 17.)
April 3, 1990

-

Robert

Busch

forfeiture.

received

the

notice

of

(Tr. 164:17-18; Trial Exhibit

21, Add. 17-18.)
In other words, the notice of default gave Buyer until April
5. 1990 (30 days from Buyer's receipt on March 6, 1990) to cure.
But Buyer received the notice of forfeiture on April 3, 1990, the
28th day of the 3 0-day cure period.

At trial, Mr. Siggard admitted

3
Although the trial transcript shows that Mr. Busch testified
he received the notice of default on March 5th (Tr. 161:20), this
was obviously an error on his part. The parties stipulated in the
Pretrial Order that the notice of default was sent on March 5, 1990
and received on March 6, 199 0.
(Pretrial Order, Uncontroverted
Fact (o); R. 890.) . It would make no sense for the notice to have
been mailed and received on the same day. Furthermore, Mr. Siggard
admitted at trial that the notice of forfeiture was "two days
early."
(Tr. 412:22-25.)
The notice of forfeiture, which was
received on April 3, 1990, could only have been two days early if
the notice of default was received on March 6, 1990.
8

that the notice of forfeiture "was two days early."

(Tr. 412:22-

25.)
When Buyer received the notice of forfeiture, Buyer took it
seriously.

The next day, April 4, 1990, Buyer filed a notice of

interest against the 38-acre parcel.
Tr. 166:5-10, 251:8-10.)

(Trial Exhibit 22, Add. 19;

That same day, he instructed his attorney

to send a letter to Seller.

(Tr. 168:1-11, 251:5-7.)

Mr. Siggard

received this letter on approximately April 5, 1990.

(Tr. 413:19-

25.) This letter stated, among other things, that Buyer considered
Seller's notice of forfeiture to be deficient because it was sent
two days premature.

(Trial Exhibit 23, Add. 21-22; Tr. 413:12-25.)

Despite this letter, Mr. Siggard did not notify Buyer that it had
any additional time in which to pay the $56,000.

(See Tr. 541:16-

22.)
Two years later, Buyer commenced this lawsuit.
Buyer

sought damages.

(R. 1, 6.)

Later, Buyer amended

complaint to seek specific performance.
305.)

Initially,
the

(R. 295, 300-303, 304-

Prior to trial, Buyer elected specific performance as its

remedy.

(R. 633-634.)

Seller counterclaimed.
damages

for Buyer's breach

damages for wrongful lien.

Seller sought, among other things,
of contract.

Seller

also

claimed

(R. 14, 18-20, 466, 473-479.)

Prior to trial, the parties agreed upon a Pretrial Order,
which was signed by the trial judge.

(R. 882-900.)

this order is included in the Addendum at pages 23-42.)
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(A copy of

At trial, Buyer had two theories.

The first was that Seller

had materially breached the contract by failing to provide a survey
required by the contract; that because of Seller's failure to
provide the survey, Buyer was excused from making the $56,000
payment; that Buyer was ready, willing, and able at the time of
trial to perform under the contract; and that, therefore, Buyer was
entitled

to

specific

performance

of

the

contract.

(Jury

Instructions 16, 18, 25, 26; R. 991, 993, 1000, 1001; see Tr.
722:9-18.)

The jury found against Buyer on this theory.

Special Verdict, Findings No. 3, 4, & 5; R. 1024.)

(See

Buyer does not

contest the jury findings on this theory.
Buyer's second theory was that "even if [Seller] did not
materially default, their attempt to forfeit [Buyer] was invalid
because they did not comply with the notice requirements of the
Contract."

(Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum at 12; R. 912.)

This

theory is found in the Pretrial Order both as a contested issue of
fact ("[w]hether [Seller] complied with the forfeiture and notice
provisions of the contract") and as a contested

issue of law

("[w]hether [Seller] was required to comply with the forfeiture and
notice provisions of the contract").

(Pretrial Order, at 10, 11;

R. 891, 892, Add. 32, 33.)
Buyer presented evidence regarding Seller's failure to comply
with the notice provisions of the contract.

For example, Mr. Busch

testified that he felt he had been "illegally forfeited" out of his
interest in the property.
"[n]otice was not right.

(Tr. 166:15.)

One reason was because

[Mr. Siggard] gave me 30 days [in which
10

to cure the default], then forfeits me out in 28."
25.)

(Tr. 166:23-

Mr. Busch also testified that although he did not pay the

$56,000 in the last two days of the 30-day cure period, he "could
have." (Tr. 252:10.)
As part of Seller7s presentation of its evidence, Mr. Siggard
testified that he prepared the notice of default and knew that it
gave Buyer 30 days from receipt to cure the default.

(Tr. 410:6-

19, 539:14-25, 540:1-6.) He also testified, however, that when he
prepared the notice of forfeiture he thought the 3 0-day period ran
from the date the initial payment was due (i.e., March 3, 1990):
Q
What did you do when you didn't hear anything
from [Buyer]?
A
Then, I thought from the time the payment was
due on March 3rd that they had 30 days to respond, and so
at the end of 30 days from then I sent another letter
telling them the contract was over.
. . . .

Q
Did you send the second notice out 28 - only 28
days after the first notice had been received?
A
I would have to count the days. When I sent
the second notice, I had forgot about the 30 days [being]
from the note being received, and thought it was 30 days
after the payment was due.
Q
Did you go back and review the first letter
before you sent the second letter?
A

I did not.

Q

How did you know what date to count from?

A

I counted from March 3rd.

Q

Why did you count from March 3rd?

A
Because that's when the payment was due. [Tr.
411:18-23, 540:15-21, 541:1-3 (emphasis added).]
11

Mr. Siggard also testified that "under my thinking, [Buyer]
could have easily made the $56,000 [payment]" during the last two
days of the 30-day cure period.

(Tr. 541:19-22.)

Mr. Siggard did

not put on any evidence, however, that he communicated this to
Buyer, i.e., that he notified Buyer it had two additional days in
which to pay the $56,000. He also did not put on any evidence that
he offered to work out an arrangement to put the contract back into
effect or to help Buyer realize any return on Buyer's development
efforts and expense.
The jury made findings by way of a special verdict.

The

jury's findings, as recounted in the trial court's Judgment, were
as follows:
(i)
The contract between [Buyer] and [Seller] was
a valid contract. (This finding was stipulated to by the
parties prior to submission to the jury); and
(ii)
[Buyer]
failed
to
fully
tender
its
performance
and
perform
all
of
its
contractual
obligations according to the terms of the Contract
including the timely payments of all amounts due (this
finding was stipulated to by the parties prior to
submission to the jury); and
(iii) [Buyer] was not excused from tendering its
performance
and
from
performing
its
contractual
obligations including its annual interest payment
obligations; and
(iv)
[Buyer] is not allowed to assert that it was
excused from failing to perform its obligations by any
one of the following: a) estoppel, b) waiver and/or
unclean hands[; and]
(v)
[Buyer]
is
not
entitled
to
performance of the Real Estate Contract; and

specific

(vi)
[Seller] performed all steps necessary to
forfeit [Buyer's] interest in the contract; and

12

(vii) The Notice of Interest was filed by [Buyer]
in violation of the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute; and
(viii) [Buyer] breached the Real Estate Contract.
[Judgment at 2-3 (emphasis added), R. 1065-1066, Add. 4950; see also Special Verdict at 1-2, R. 1023-1025, Add.
45-47.]
The jury also found that Buyer's actual damages proximately
caused by the filing of the Notice of Interest were $0.

[Judgment

at 3, R. 1066; see also Special Verdict at 3, R. 1025.]
Based on the jury's findings, the trial court entered the
following judgment:
1.
[Buyer's] First Amended Complaint for Specific
Performance is dismissed with prejudice;
2.
[Seller's] Counterclaims for breach of contract
and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
are hereby granted, the Real Estate Contract is hereby
made null and void, and [Buyer's] interest in any and all
real property under the Real Estate Contract is
forfeited; and
3.
[Seller's] Counterclaim for Wrongful Lien,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 38-9-1 is hereby granted and,
because no actual damages were offered at trial or found
by the jury, the statutory penalty of $1,000 is hereby
entered of record, with a memorandum of costs and
attorneys' fees to be submitted.
[Judgment at 3-4
(emphasis added), R. 1066-1067, Add. 50-51.]
Buyer filed a timely motion for a new trial of the jury
findings that (1) Seller performed all steps necessary to forfeit
Buyer's interest in the contract and (2) the Notice of Interest was
filed by [Buyer] in violation of the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute.
(R. 1146-1156, 1222-1231.)
R.

Civ.

P.

59(a)(6),

The basis for Buyer's motion was Utah

which

permits

a

new

trial

because

of

"[i]nsufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other
decision, or that it is against the law."
13

(R. 1146-1156.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I:

A trial court's denial of a motion for new trial

based on insufficiency of the evidence is reversed only if the
evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unjust and
unreasonable.

This case meets that standard.

POINT II: Under Utah law, a seller must comply strictly with
the notice provisions of the contract to forfeit a purchaser's
interest.

Seller failed to do this.

Also, even though Buyer

immediately notified Seller of the defective notice, Seller failed
to give Buyer any additional time in which to make the $56,000
payment.

Therefore, the forfeiture was invalid, and the jury's

finding on this issue should be reversed.
POINT III: Under the Wrongful Lien statute, Buyer's notice of
interest is not "wrongful" unless it was "groundless" or contained
"a false claim."

A groundless lien is one that has "no arguable

basis" or is "not supported by any credible evidence."

Here,

Buyer's notice of interest against the 38-acre parcel was supported
by the fact that the notice of forfeiture was two days premature;
that Buyer had the right to designate its 16 acres anywhere within
the 38-acre parcel; that Buyer was not contractually obligated to
do so until after site plan approval; that Buyer could not do so
until after site plan approval; and that a site plan application
could not be submitted without a perimeter boundary survey, which
Buyer did not receive until July 1994.
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ARGUMENT

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Where a party moves for a new trial based upon insufficiency

of the evidence to support the jury's verdict, and the trial court
denies the motion, the trial court's denial will be reversed on
appeal only if "the evidence to support the verdict was completely
lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict
plainly unreasonable and unjust."
730, 732 (Utah 1982).

Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P.2d

Accord Peats v. Commercial Security Bank,

746 P.2d 1191, 1192 (Utah App. 1987); Rovlance v. Rowe, 737 P.2d
232, 234 (Utah App. 1987).
In this case, the foregoing standard is met.

As will be

shown, the only evidence was that Seller failed to comply with the
contractual requirement that Buyer be allowed 30 days in which to
cure its default.

And, given that the notice of forfeiture was

premature, Buyer had reasonable grounds to file its notice of
interest, and thus did not violate the Wrongful Lien statute.
II.

THE JURY ERRED IN FINDING THAT SELLER PERFORMED ALL STEPS
NECESSARY TO FORFEIT BUYERS INTEREST IN THE CONTRACT
Buyer does not dispute the jury's findings that Buyer was not

excused from making the $56,000 annual interest payment; that Buyer
breached the contract; or that, consequently, Buyer is not entitled
to specifically enforce the contract.

(R. 1024, Add. 46.)

The

issue before this Court is, given the jury's finding of Buyer's
breach of contract, what steps were necessary for Seller to forfeit
Buyer's interest under the contract?
15

A.

The Strict Compliance Rule

Forfeiture is a harsh remedy.

The Utah Supreme Court has

stated that forfeitures "are not favored in the law" (Russell v.
Park City Utah Corp., 29 Utah 2d 184, 506 P.2d 1274, 1276 (1973))
and are "regarded as odious to the law."
3 Utah 2d 428, 286 P.2d 229, 231 (1955).
seeks

to

invoke

a

forfeiture

prerequisites thereof."

must

Morgan v. Sorenson,
Consequently, "one who

strictly

comply

with

the

Russell v. Park City Corp., supra, 506

P.2d at 1276 (emphasis added).
Forfeiture is especially harsh when it is used by a seller to
terminate a buyer's interest under a real estate contract.

Unlike

4

other seller remedies, which protect a buyer's equity

or give a
5

buyer

a period

of time

in which

to redeem

the property,

a

forfeiture irrevocably terminates a buyer's entire equity interest
in the property regardless of how valuable that interest may be.
To soften the harshness of forfeiture and to afford buyers
some

degree

of protection, the Utah

courts have

consistently

applied the strict compliance rule to real estate sales.

For

example in Grow v. Marwick Development Inc., 621 P.2d 1249, 1251
(Utah 1980) , the Utah Supreme Court stated:

A trust deed foreclosure, for example, protects a buyer's
equity because any money received at the public auction over the
amount of the debt goes back to the defaulting buyer.
The contract in this case permits the seller to treat the
contract as a note and mortgage and institute foreclosure
proceedings.
(Contract, para. 18.B, Trial Exhibit 7, Add. 5.)
Such a remedy gives the buyer six months in which to redeem the
property. U.C.A. § 78-37-6; Utah R.Civ.P. 69(j)(3).
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This Court has consistently held that in order to
forfeit a purchaser's interest under a uniform real
estate contract, the seller must comply strictly with the
notice provisions of the contract.
In Grow, the seller sent a notice of default twice, then a
notice of forfeiture, followed by another notice of default to
bring the contract current within 15 days or forfeiture would
result.

The supreme court held the foregoing series of notices to

be "misleading," stating that "[t]his would leave some doubt in the
[buyers'] minds as to what the
1252.

[seller] expected."

621 P.2d at

Therefore, the court held that the buyer had until the final

15-day period to bring the contract current.
Another Utah case applying the strict compliance rule is Adair
v. Bracken, 745 P.2d 849 (Utah App. 1987).

There the contract

provided that sellers had a right to forfeit the buyers in the
event of default, "upon the failure of Buyer to remedy default
within five days after written notice." 745 P.2d at 852.

The

sellers' agent sent buyers a notice of default which was defective
because it failed to mention sellers' intentions to pursue their
contractual remedies if buyers did not cure the default. Id. at
850.

Later the sellers' agent sent a second notice which was

defective because it "fatally omitted" the amount the sellers were
demanding.

Id. at 852.

notice of forfeiture.

In addition, the sellers failed to send a
Three years after the second notice was

sent, the buyers tendered the full amount owing, which the sellers
refused on the basis that the buyers' interest had been forfeited.
Id. at 850.
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After first quoting Grow v. Marwick, supra, this Court held
the forfeiture invalid because the content of the two notices of
default was defective, and because no notice of forfeiture was
sent.

This Court emphasized that the sending of a notice of

forfeiture is not just a mere formality, but is an essential,
substantive requirement.

This Court stated:

A notice of forfeiture is a declaration that the
seller is no longer just threatening to invoke this
contractual remedy, but has in fact elected the
forfeiture option—after the buyers7 failure to cure the
default within a reasonable time after adequate notice of
default—and
has thereby terminated the buyers7
contractual interest. . . . A notice of forfeiture leaves
no room for speculation about the extinguishment of the
buyers7 rights in the contract. [745 P.2d at 853 (bold
added).]
Based on the foregoing analysis, this Court held that the sellers
had failed to forfeit the buyers7 rights prior to the buyers7
tender of full payment.
The strict compliance rule is fair to a seller, because it
imposes no great burden for a seller to comply with the notice
requirements it has already agreed to in the contract. The strict
compliance rule is preferable to a "substantial" compliance rule
because

it

creates

a

definite,

bright-line

test.

With

a

substantial compliance rule, that line would always be in question.
Is a notice delivered two days early permissible?
days early? Ten days? Fifteen days?

What about five

The wisdom of the strict

compliance rule is that it avoids this quandary.
A substantial compliance rule would create the very problems
that Grow v. Marwick and Adair v. Bracken seek to prevent.

If a

seller could send notice of forfeiture early, then (paraphrasing
18

Grow) it would be "misleading" and would "leave doubt" in the
buyer's mind as to what was expected. And (paraphrasing Adair) the
buyer would be left to "speculate" as to whether his rights had
been extinguished.
The jury was instructed as to the strict compliance rule.
Jury Instruction 38 states, "In order to forfeit a purchaser's
interest under a real estate contract, the Seller must comply
strictly with the notice provisions of the contract."
B.

(R. 1012.)

Evidence Supporting the Jury's Verdict

As has been stated in the Facts section, supra, the evidence
showed that the contract required Seller to give Buyer 30 days to
cure its default, and that Buyer received the notice of forfeiture
two days before the 3 0-day cure period expired.

Indeed, Mr.

Siggard admitted that the notice of forfeiture was "two days
early."

(Tr. 412:22-25.)

In response, Buyer immediately filed a

notice of interest and instructed its attorney to send a letter
pointing out that the forfeiture notice was premature.

At that

point, Seller could have corrected the error either by notifying
Buyer that it had two extra days in which to make a payment, or by
starting the whole process over again. Seller did neither of these
things.

(See Tr. 541:16-22.)

The only evidence that might be construed as supporting the
jury's finding

is Mr. Siggard's testimony

forfeiture notice early by mistake.

that he

sent the

He thought the 30-day period

ran from the date payment was due (March 3, 1990) rather than the
date Buyer received the notice of default (March 6, 1990).
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Under

the strict compliance rule, however, this is not relevant. A buyer
is entitled to proper notice.

If notice is improper, it does not

matter whether the error is intentional or accidental.

If proper

notice is not given, the attempted forfeiture is invalid.

Grow v.

Marwick, supra; Adair v. Bracken, supra.
C.

Conclusion

Because the evidence on this point is not in dispute and
because the law is clear, this Court should reverse the jury's
finding, and remand this case with directions to the trial court to
rule that Buyer's interest is not forfeited until Seller gives
Buyer a new notice of default and a new opportunity to cure.

In

the alternative, a new trial of this issue should be ordered.

If

in the new trial the jury finds that Seller did not perform all
steps necessary to forfeit Buyer's interest under the contract,
then the trial court should rule that Buyer's interest is not
forfeited until Seller gives Buyer a new notice of default and a
new opportunity to cure.
III.

THE JURY ERRED IN FINDING THAT BUYER'S NOTICE OF INTEREST
VIOLATED THE WRONGFUL LIEN STATUTE
The jury found that Buyer's filing of a notice of interest

violated the Wrongful Lien statute, U.C.A. § 38-9-1 et seq.

Buyer

also challenges this finding as being unsupported by the evidence.
A.

The Wrongful Lien Statute

The Wrongful Lien statute provides

landowners a cause of

action against a person who claims an interest in real property,
who records such a claim with the county recorder, and "who knows
20

or has reason to know that the document is forged, groundless, or
contains a material misstatement

or a false claim"

U.C.A.

§ 38-9-1.
At trial, Seller did not contend that the notice of interest
filed by Buyer was "forged" or that it contained "a material
misstatement."

Jury instruction 42, to which Seller took no

exception (Tr. 710-717), states that seller must prove the notice
of interest was "groundless" or "contained a false claim."

(R.

1016.)
The term "groundless" is not defined in the statute, and
apparently no Utah case has ever construed that term. However, in
Evergreen West, Inc. v. Boyd, 810 P.2d 612 (Ariz. App. 1991), the
Arizona Court of Appeals construed the term

"groundless" in

Arizona's Wrongful Lien statute, A.R.S. § 33-420, which has
language very close to Utah's statute.

In that case, the

plaintiff sought to remove a lis pendens against its property. The
court held that the statute permitted removal of a lis pendens
alleged to be groundless

6

A.R.S. § 33-420(A) reads:

A person purporting to claim an interest in, or a
lien or encumbrance against, real property, who causes a
document asserting such claim to be recorded or filed in
the office of the county recorder, knowing or having
reason to know that the document is forged, groundless,
or contains a material misstatement or false claim or is
otherwise invalid is liable to the owner or beneficial
title holder for the sum of not less than five thousand
dollars, or for treble the actual damages caused by the
recording or filing, whichever is greater, and reasonable
attorney fees and costs of the action. [Emphasis added.]
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only where the claim that the underlying action is one
affecting title to real property has no arguable basis or
is not supported by any credible evidence.
[810 P.2d at
619 (emphasis added).]
In arriving at this definition, the Arizona court looked at
Black7s Dictionary, which equates the term "groundless" with the
Id. at 619 (citing Black7s Dictionary at 704

term "frivolous."
(6th ed. 1990) .

"A claim . . .

is frivolous if a proponent can

present no rational argument" in support of that claim.

810 P.2d

at 619 (citing Black's Dictionary, supra, at 668).
In other words, to find that a person knows or has reason to
know a claim is "groundless" requires more than simply finding that
a claim lacks support.

It must be so lacking in support that the

person knows or has reason to know the claim has no arguable or
rational basis, is frivolous, or is unsupported by any credible
evidence.
Consistent

with

the

foregoing

case

law,

the

jury

was

instructed that a document is groundless "only if the interest
claimed in the document has no arguable basis or is not supported
by any credible evidence."
B.

(Jury Instruction No. 43; R. 1017.)

Evidence Supporting the Jury's Verdict

Viewing the testimony in a light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, the evidence supporting the jury's finding of Wrongful
Lien is as follows:
•

When Buyer filed its notice of interest, Buyer
had already received a notice of forfeiture
from Seller. (Tr. 164-165.)

•

Buyer's notice of interest is against the
entire 38-acre parcel, not just the 16 acres
22

Buyer was purchasing.
166.)

(Trial Exhibit 22; Tr.

•

In Buyer's applications to Sandy City for
commercial zoning, Buyer requested zoning only
at the corner of 11400 South and 1000 East.
(E.g. Trial Exhibit 9; Tr. 216:22-25, 217:12.)

•

Before Buyer defaulted, Mr. Siggard requested
Buyer on more than one occasion to designate
where its 16 acres would be, but Buyer did
not. (Tr. 405:11-17, 407-408.)

•

In 1994, about four years after Buyer filed
its notice of interest, Mr. Siggard paid for a
perimeter survey of the entire 38-acre parcel.
The purpose of the survey was to make it
possible for Buyer to designate its 16 acres,
so that Buyer could release its notice of
interest as to the remaining 22 acres. But
Buyer still did not designate the 16 acres.
(Tr. 337:23-25, 338:10-25, 356:7-14, 422-423.)

In regard

to the

location

of the

16 acres, Mr.

Siggard

testified that the property that Buyers wanted was at the corner of
11400 South and 1000 East:
Q
Okay.
Let me just, then, ask if in this
meeting in your home you had a discussion with Mr. Walton
[Buyer's representative] related to identifying the
approximate boundaries of commercial zoning?
A
Yes.
He had pointed down to the corner of
11400th South and 10th East, which would be the southeast
corner of the intersection.
Q

Did he indicate a preference for the corner?

A
That was definitely the corner they wanted.
[Tr. 383:17-25.]
The foregoing evidence, however, is so slight and unconvincing
as to make the jury's finding plainly unreasonable and unjust, in
light of the following well-established facts:
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1.

The Notice of Forfeiture Was Premature.

As shown at

Point II, supra, the notice of forfeiture was received two days
before the 3 0-day cure period had expired. Also, Buyer immediately
sent a letter notifying Seller of the defect in the notice. Based
upon the strict compliance rule previously discussed, Buyer had an
"arguable basis" to believe that the forfeiture attempted by Seller
was invalid and that, therefore, Buyer still had an interest in the
property when it filed the notice of interest.
2.

Buyer Had the Right to Designate its Acreage Anywhere

Within the 38-Acre Parcel. The contract gave Buyer "the exclusive
right" to designate its acreage anywhere within the 38-acre parcel.
(Contract, f 1; Trial Exhibit 7, Add. 1.)

Mr. Siggard admitted

this in cross-examination.

7

.

Q And it's your position or your feeling today,
isn't it, that Commercial Investment Corporation still
doesn't have the absolute right to choose where that
ground will lie, isn't that correct:
A
No. They have the corner of it. According to
the contract, they have the absolute right.
Q
Unless, at least as far as you're concerned, if
that right is exercised in such a way as to pull this
project away from the actual boundary that you think is
there, you don't think they have that right, do you?
A
You mean from the boundary that they have put
there?
Q
No, no. The actual boundary for your ground,
wherever it may sit?
A
I guess legally they have that right.
Q
They do have that right?
A
They do have that right.
Q
Although you didn't want them to have that
right.
A
Well, we verbally said it would be - with Andy
Walton - it would be to my boundaries, but I guess the
contract might call for something else. [Tr. 503:3-25
(emphasis added).]
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3.

The Purchase Contract Did Not Require Designation of

Buyer's Acreage Prior to Site Plan Approval.
purchase

contract, two

events had

to

occur

Pursuant to the
before

Buyer

was

required to designate its 16 acres: commercial zoning and site plan
approval.

Paragraph 3 of the contract provides that "[w]ithin

forty-five

(45) days after Buyer

obtains from

Sandy

City the

commercial zoning and site plan approval for the Property, the
parties agree to terminate this Contract and merge this Contract
into a Warranty Deed, Trust Deed and Note."

(Contract, f 3, Trial

Exhibit 7, Add. 2 (emphasis added); Tr. 115:15-19.)
To obtain site plan approval, the developer was required to
first submit one or more preliminary site plans.

The final step

was to then prepare a final site plan and submit it with a site
plan application.

(Tr. 127:4-5, 188:8-9, 189:17-18, 279:23-24,

281:19-21, 339:11-16, 527:12-15; Trial Exhibits 3, 4, 8, 9, 35,
37.)
The commercial

zoning was granted

133:13-19: 403:17-24.)

in August

1989.

(Tr.

Buyer submitted preliminary site plans, a

final site plan, and an application for site plan approval.

(Tr.

127:4-5, 188:8-9, 189:17-18, 279:23-24, 281:19-21, 339:11-16; Trial
Exhibits 3, 4, 8, 9, 35, 37.)

But at no time prior to trial did

Sandy City ever grant site plan approval.
2.)

(Tr. 417:24-25, 418:1-

Thus, at no time prior to trial was Buyer contractually bound

to designate its 16 acres.
4.

Designation of Buyer's Acreage Was Not Possible Prior to

Site Plan Approval.

Prior to site plan approval, Buyer could not
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designate its 16 acres.

This is because the legal description

attached to the commercial zone was only approximate.
18.)

(Tr. 590:15-

Mr. Michael Coulam, the community development director for

Sandy City, testified that this zone was "not common" because it
was designed to allow the site plan to shift a bit at the site plan
approval stage. (Tr. 591:4-6, 11.)

He further testified:

Q
In order to give the developer the ability to
purchase ground from a seller, they would have to keep
that legal description fluid, essentially, until site
plan approval?
A

That's correct

[Tr. 591:7-11.]

Mr. Robert Busch, Buyer's president, similarly testified that
when he met with Sandy City, the city "wanted us to shift the
commercial site around somewhat."

(Tr. 106:23-25.)

He would not

know until final site plan approval where the exact location of the
property

would

be.

(Tr.

50:18-23,

242:2-12,

243:3-4.)

Consequently, when he filed the notice of interest, he used the
legal description for the entire 38 acres:
Q
And why did you use the entire
legal
description for the 38 acres, as opposed to using one of
the lesser legal descriptions — the 20, 16, 13 acres?
A
Because we had the right to select the 20 out
of the 38.
Q
So why, if you had that right, did you need to
use the legal description in its entirety?
A
Because I didn't know
at that time, starting on the
know how to describe it because
exactly insofar as the piece of
to take.

how to describe the acres
20, but I still did not
it had never been defined
ground that we were going

Q
Hadn't been described because you had not yet
obtained site plan approval?
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A
Site plan approval so I didn't know where it
was going to be. [Tr. 263:2-18.]
Although Mr. Siggard testified that, in his prior experience,
any boundary changes required by the city occur on the preliminary
site plans and not "right at the end"

(Tr. 527:10-11), he was

testifying only in the context of residential projects.
528:5-8.)

The testimony of Michael Coulam and Mr. Busch were in

the context of commercial projects.
5.

(Tr.

Site

Plan Approval

(Tr. 106:23-25, 590:13.)

Could

Not

Be

Obtained

Without

a

Perimeter Boundary Survey. The contract requires Seller to provide
Buyer "with a certified ALTA survey."
Exhibit 7, Add. 3-4.)

(Contract, f 12, Trial

An ALTA survey is more detailed than an

ordinary survey, because the surveyor locates all features that are
actually on the property, such as easements of record, and anything
else that might be germane to the use of the property.

(Tr. 610:3-

11.)
Sandy City's Site Plan Review Procedures and Standards set
forth information that must be included in the final site plan
filed with the site plan application.

(Trial Exhibit 36; Tr. 348.)

Such information includes dimension orientation; legal description;
location

and

transmission

height

of

overhead

power,

communication,

lines and utility easements; and

and

location of all

existing and proposed curbs, gutters, sidewalks, sewage mainlines,
water lines, fire hydrants, and adjacent streets.

(Tr. 350-351.)

Prior to receiving the ALTA perimeter boundary survey, Buyer did
not have any of this information.
also

provided

other

information
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(Tr. 350-351.)
required

on

The ALTA survey
the

site

plan

application, such as the location of beginning and ending points of
the boundary and existing roads.

(Tr. 342.)

Hence, Mr. Busch testified that the "[b]oundary survey was
necessary
approval."

for

me

to

then

(Tr. 255:3-4.)

move

forward

and

get

a

site

plan

As soon as he received the boundary

survey in July 1994 (four years after filing suit), he proceeded to
work on site planning approval and caused an application to be made
to Sandy City on September 20, 1994.

(Tr. 258:13-25; Trial Exhibit

35.)
Although it is true that Buyer wanted its 16 acres to be
located at the corner of 114 00 South and 1000 East, Buyer could not
ensure the exact location of its 16 acres until it had obtained
final site plan approval.
to this.

The boundary survey was a pre-requisite

(Tr. 255:3-4.)

In light of the foregoing, it cannot be said that Buyer 7 s
filing of a notice of interest against the entire 38-acre parcel
was groundless, i.e., had no arguable basis or was not supported by
any credible evidence.

Buyer had an arguable basis for filing the

notice, which was that it received the forfeiture notice two days
premature and therefore believed, based on Utah law, that the
forfeiture was invalid.

Buyer also had an arguable basis for

filing against the entire 38-acre parcel, based on the facts that
Buyer had the right to designate its 16 acres anywhere within the
38 acre parcel; that Buyer was not contractually obligated to
designate until after it received site plan approval; that Buyer
could not designate until it received site plan approval; and that
28

Buyer could not obtain site plan approval without the survey, which
it did not receive until July 1994. For the same reasons, Buyer's
filing of the notice of interest was not a "false claim."

The

jury's finding in this regard is unsupported.
CONCLUSION
The jury's findings should be reversed, and the case remanded
with directions to the trial court to rule that Buyer's interest is
not forfeited until Seller gives Buyer a new notice of default and
a new opportunity to cure. In the alternative, the case should be
remanded for a new trial on the contested issues with instructions
to the trial court that if the jury finds that Seller did not take
all steps necessary to forfeit Buyer's interest, then Buyer's
interest is not forfeited until Seller gives Buyer new notice and
a new opportunity to cure.
DATED this 5Vfl

day of September, 1996.
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

By:

907\89\APPEAL\BRIEF.2

29

'"Itbils) UVMAM?.
James lb/ Christensen
Mark J. Morrise

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Mark J. Morrise, certify that on theovTl

day of September,

1996, I mailed, postage prepaid, two copies of the foregoing Brief
of Appellant to the below named counsel:
Randall N. Skanchy
Scott D. Cheney
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Mark J. Morrise
Attorney for Appellant

30

Addenda

ADDENDUM
This Addendum is consecutively page-numbered in the upper
right-hand corner of each page. References in the brief to "Add."
are to these numbers.
Addendum
Page Number
Real Estate Contract (Tr. Exh. 7)

1

March 5, 1990 Notice of Default (Tr. Exh. 20)

15

April 3, 1990 Notice of Forfeiture (Tr. Exh. 21)

17

Notice of Interest (Tr. Exh. 22)

19

Letter to Siggards dated April 4, 1990 (Tr. Exh. 23)

....

21

Pretrial Order

23

Jury Instruction 38

43

Jury Instruction 43

44

Special Verdict

45

Judgment

48

0000/
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT

°fy,.
'JCf

This Contract is made and entered: into this
31 '
day of
M^y, 1988 by and between Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard,
Trustees ("Sellers"), whose address is 3318 Oakcliff Drive,
Holladay, Utah 84124 and Commercial Investment Corporation, a
Utah corporation ("Buyer"), whose address is 5250 South 300 West,
Suite 100, Murray, Utah 84107,
RECITALS:
A.
On March 3, 1988, Sellers and Busch Corporation and/or
assigns entered into an Earnest Money Sales Agreement for the
purchase of approximately 20 acres real property to be zoned
commercial.
Busch Corporation has assigned all of its right,
title and interest in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement to Buyer.
B.
Pursuant to the terms of the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement, Buyer has no obligation to close until: (1) Sandy City
has approved Buyer's site plan and commercial zoning; (2) Buyer
has verified proper access to existing utilities and public
roadways: and (3) Buyer has approved the survey.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, the mutual
promises contained herein and other good and valuable
consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby
acknowledged, the parties agree as follows:
1.
Property.
Sellers agree to sell and Buyer agrees to
buy approximately 20 acres of
real property (the "Property")
located at the southeast corner of 11400 South 1000 East, in the
City of Sandy, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, which Property
is part of:
The Northwest Quarter of the Southeast
Quarter of Section 20, Township 3 South,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
excepting therefrom the following: Beginning
North 0°07f30H West 1327.82 feet from the
South quarter corner of said Section 20; and
running thence North 0°07f30" West 180.84
feet; thence North 89°52'30" East 456 feet;
thence South 0°07,30" East 183.58 feet more
or less; thence North 89*46'51" West 456 feet
more or less to the point of beginning.
Buyer shall have the exclusive right to identify the boundaries
of the Property it is purchasing which boundaries shall not
exceed the boundaries delineated on Exhibit "A.,f
Buyer agrees
that it will not purchase property and identify boundaries
thereto which encompass all of the frontage to the property along
11400 South; Sellers shall retain sufficient frontage on 11400
South to have direct access to its proposed residential
development as set forth on the Crescent Village Community

00002
Shopping Center Site Plan, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit A,
2.

Price and Payment.

A.
Buyer agrees to pay Sellers for the Property the
purchase price of Thirty Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00) per
acre payable at Sellers1 address above given, or Sellers1 order,
on the following terms:
Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) ("Down
Payment"), receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged; and Buyer shall pay annual
interest payments beginning March 3, 1989 and
continuing on the 3rd day of each March
thereafter until March 3, 1998 at which time
the entire unpaid principal balance together
with accrued interest shall be paid in full.
Interest shall accrue on the unpaid balance
at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum.
Interest to accrue from March 3, 1988.
B.
The parties agree to deposit the Down Payment with
Landmark Title Company and hereby instruct Landmark Title Company
to deposit the Down Payment in its interest bearing Trust
Account. The Down Payment, with the accrued interest, shall be
disbursed to Sellers upon the execution of a Trust Deed and Note
and Warranty Deed as required by Paragraph 3 below. In the event
Buyer duly rescinds this Contract, then the principal of the Down
Payment shall be returned to Buyer and the interest accrued
thereon shall be paid to Sellers.
C.
The Installment Note in the amount of $5,000.00,
which was attached to the Earnest Money Sales Agreement as part
of the Down Payment, is hereby cancelled.
3.
Merger of Contract Into Deed and Trust Deed and Note.
Within forty-five (45) days after Buyer obtains from Sandy City
the commercial zoning and site plan approval for the Property,
the parties agree to terminate this Contract and merge this
Contract into a Warranty Deed, Trust Deed and Note. Buyer shall
execute and deliver to Sellers a Trust Deed and Note and Sellers
shall execute and deliver to Buyer a Warranty Deed. Buyer shall
give Sellers written notice so that parties can select a mutually
convenient date for the termination of this Contract and
execution of the Warranty Deed, Trust Deed, and Note. Copies of
the Warranty Deed, Trust Deed and Note are attached hereto as
Exhibits "B", "C" and "D" respectively and by this reference made
a part hereof.
4.
Partial Releases,
Sellers agree to partially release
their security interest in the Property and convey a Warranty
Deed to Buyer for such released property upon payment under this
2
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Contract of $35,000.00 towards principal per acre. Sellers agree
to execute such releases and warranty deeds at the request of
Buyer.
Buyer may make such request at any such time as any
principal payments are made.
5.
Date of Possession. Sellers agree to deliver to Buyer
possession and Buyer agrees to enter into possession of each acre
of the Property upon merger of this Contract into Deed, Trust
Deed, and Note as set forth in Paragraph 3 above.
6.
Risk of Loss. All risk of loss and destruction of the
Property shall be borne by Sellers until Buyers take possession
of the Property.
7.
Conveyance of Title.
Sellers, on receiving the
payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner
specified herein, agree to execute and deliver to Buyer, or its
assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title
to the Property free and clear of all encumbrances except those
which have accrued by or through the acts or neglect of Buyer and
subject to the exceptions to title that are contained in the
Commitment described in Section 8.
8.
Evidence of Title. Sellers shall provide Buyer with a
Preliminary Commitment for Title Insurance ("Commitment") on the
Property at the time of or prior to execution of this Contract.
Sellers shall, at their expense and upon execution of the
documents described in paragraph 3 above, furnish Buyer evidence
of marketable title in the form of an Owner's Title Insurance
Policy ("Title Policy") insuring Buyer's interest in the Property
under this Contract for the amount of the purchase price. The
Title Policy issued to Buyer will contain the following numbered
exceptions shown on the Cqmmitment: ^r^Hecfa ler )&' vj^cr/cW^,
,^£y
^XTGr^i /7&ret t **>d /drift* KS
.

9.
Underlying Obligations.
Except for 1988 taxes and
assessments, Sellers warrant that there are no underlying
obligations against the Property,
10. Sellers' Covenant Against Liens. Except for the liens
and encumbrances listed in Sections 8 and 9, Sellers covenant to
keep the Property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances
resulting from acts of Sellers.
11. Buyer's Covenant Against Liens.
Buyer covenants to
keep the Property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances
resulting from acts of Buyer during the term of this Contract,
except for property which Buyer purchases under Section 4 herein.
12.

Survey.

Sellers agree, at their expense, to provide

3
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Buyer with a certified ALTA survey within forty-five (45) days
after Buyer obtains from Sandy City the commercial zoning for the
Property.
13. Zoning. Sellers warrant and represent that they have
received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation
concerning the Property which has not been remedied prior to the
execution of this Contract.
14. Taxes and Assessments. Sellers agree to pay all taxes
and assessments of every kind which become due on the Property
during the life of this Contract. Sellers covenant that there
are no taxes, assessments, or liens against the Property not
mentioned in Section 8.
Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and
assessments upon and after execution of the documents described
in paragraph 3 above. Buyer further agrees to reimburse Sellers
for all taxes and assessment they pay from the Contract date to
the execution of the documents described in paragraph 3 above.
15. No Waste. Buyer agrees not to commit nor suffer to be
committed any waste, spoil or destruction in or upon the Property
which would impair Sellers' security.
16. Commercial Zoning. Buyer, at its expense, shall apply
for commercial zoning on the Property to build a commercial
center thereon.
However, should Buyer fail, with or without
cause, to obtain such commercial zoning prior to March 3, 1989,
then the Contract shall be void and the Down Payment refunded to
Buyer.
17. Sellers' Option to Discharge Obligations.
If Buyer
defaults in the payment of taxes, assessments or other expenses
of the Property, Sellers may, at Sellers' option, pay said taxes,
assessments, insurance premiums or other expenses.
If Sellers
elect to do so, Buyer agrees to repay Sellers upon demand all
such sums so advanced and paid by Sellers together with interest
thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of ten
percent (10%) per annum until paid.
When the principal sum
provided in this Contract is paid, if Buyer fails to also repay
Sellers such advances, Sellers may refuse to convey title to the
Property until such repayment is made.
18. Buyer's Default. Should Buyer fail to comply with any
of the terms hereof, Sellers may, in addition to any other
remedies afforded the Sellers in this Contract or by law, elect
either of the following remedies:
A.
Sellers shall give Buyer written notice
specifically stating: (1) the Buyer's default(s); (2) that Buyer
shall have thirty (30) days from its receipt of such written
notice within which to cure the default(s), which cure shall
4
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include payment of Sellers1 costs and reasonable attorney's fees;
and (3) Sellers' intent to elect this remedy if the Buyer does
not cure the default(s) within thirty (30) days. Should Buyer
fail to cure such default(s) within the thirty (30) days, then
Sellers shall give to Buyer another written notice informing
Buyer of his failure to cure the default(s) and of Sellers'
election of this remedy.
Immediately upon Buyer's receipt of
this second written notice, Sellers shall be released from all
obligations at law and equity to convey the Property to Buyer,
and Buyer shall become at once a tenant-at-will of Sellers. All
payments which have been made by Buyer prior thereto under this
Contract shall, subject to then existing law and equity, be
retained by Sellers as liquidated and agreed damages for breach
of this Contract; or
B.
Sellers shall give Buyer written notice
specifically stating: (1) The Buyer's default(s); (2) that Buyer
shall have thirty (30) days from its receipt of such written
notice within which to cure the default(s); and (3) Sellers'
intent to elect this remedy if the Buyer does not cure the
default(s) with the thirty (30) days. Should Buyer fail to cure
such default(s) within the thirty (30) days, then Sellers shall
give to Buyer another written notice informing Buyer of its
failure to cure the default(s), Sellers' election of this remedy,
and that the entire unpaid balance hereunder is at once due and
payable. Thereupon, Sellers may treat this Contract as a note
and mortgage, pass or tender title to Buyer subject thereto, and
proceed immediately with a mortgage foreclosure in accordance
with the laws of the State of Utah. Upon filing the foreclosure
complaint in court, Sellers shall be entitled to the immediate
appointment of a receiver. The receiver may take possession of
the Property, collect rents, issues and profits therefrom and
apply them to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold
them pursuant to the order of the court.
Upon entry of a
judgment of foreclosure, Sellers shall not be entitled to
possession of the Property until the redemption period expires.
19. Buyer's Remedies.
In addition to any other remedy
available to Buyer at law or in equity, Buyer may elect to
rescind this Contract upon the occurrence of any of the
following:
A.

Buyer's reasonable objection to the survey;

B.
Buyer's inability to obtain direct and immediate
access, without unreasonable expense, to existing utilities for
sewer, water, natural gas and electricity;
C.
Buyer's failure to obtain access to the Property
from paved public roadways;
D.

Buyer's failure, with or without cause, to obtain

5

00006
commercial zoning, acceptable to Buyer, for a commercial -center
on the Property; and
E.
Sellers breach of any covenant or term contained
in this Contract•
Upon rescission of the Contract, the Down Payment shall be
returned to Buyer and Buyer shall have no further obligations
under this Contract•
20. Time of Essence. It is expressly agreed that time is
of the essence in this Contract.
21. Captions. Section captions shall not in any way limit
modify, or alter the provisions in the Section.
22. Notices.
Except as otherwise provided herein, all
notices required under this Contract will be effective when: (a)
personally delivered; or (b) mailed certified or registered,
addressed to the applicable party at the address shown in this
contract, or at such other address as may be hereinafter
designated by such party by written notice to the other party.
23. Binding Effect. This Contract is binding on the heirs,
personal representatives, successors and assigns of the
respective parties hereto.
24. Entire Agreement.
This Contract contains the entire
agreement between the parties hereto. Any provision hereof not
enforceable under the laws of the State of Utah shall not affect
the validity of any other provisions hereof.
No supplement,
modification or amendment of this Contract shall be binding on
the parties hereto unless signed in writing by both parties
hereto.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have duly executed this
Contract the day and year first above written.

6
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Sellers:
NVESTMENT CORPORATION
Don SiggardyUTrustee

&. OP. M

'J (fiufZ

Glenna F. Sigga

rustee*

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
STATE OF UTAH

)

) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
19 86
personally appeared before me Don Niggard and Glenna F. Siggard,
Trustees, signers of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged
to me that they executed the same.
On

the

31*

day

of

/7JJAAAATT

fr£ktl>

Not
ublic
Res' ding at
y/C,

/AfaA

My commission expires:

STATE OF UTAH
:ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

On t h e ^ / f l

da

, 19ft3fl,
personally
* °f /ft/atM*
appeared b e f o r e me {foafad/Jj 7> A/a//ms<
>„ who being by me
d u l y sworn, d i d s a y t h a t he Jte t h e
i/fci /yiesufAn-F
of
Commercial Investment Corporation, a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n and t h a t
instrument was s i g n e d i n b e h a l f of s a i d c o r p o r a t i o n by a u t h o r i t y
of i t s bylaws ( o r of a r e s o l u t i o n of i t s Board of D i r e c t o r s as
the c a s e may b e ) , and s a i d /9s?dnJkJd ^jJ^/L/rry^ acknowledge t o me
t h a t s a i d c o r p o r a t i o n e x e c u t e s the^/feame.

< &££
CMtoA.
^

No£^£^£ublic
Residing at
My commission expires:

? *-M
*Trustee under the Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard Family
Trust Agreement
23:Busch.Cnt
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Exhibit

M

B"

WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:
Busch Corporation
5250 South 300 West, Suite 100
Murray, Utah 84107
WARRANTY DEED
Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, Trustees, grantors, Salt Lake
City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, hereby CONVEY and
WARRANT to Commercial Investment Corporation, a Utah corporation
of Murray, Utah, grantee, for the sum of Ten DOLLARS and other
good and valuable consideration the following described tract of
land in Salt Lake County, State of Utah:
See legal description attached hereto
and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A,"
DATED this

day of

, 19

•

Don Siggard, Trustee*
Glenna F. Siggard, Trustee*
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
County of Salt Lake )
On the
day of
, 19 , personally appeared
before me Don Siggard, Trustee and Glenna F. Siggard, Trustee who
being by me duly sworn, did duly acknowledge to me that they
executed the same.

Notary Public
Residing at _
My commission expires:

* Trustee under the Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard Family
Trust Agreement
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E x h i b i t "C"
When Recorded Mail To:
Don and Glenna F. Siggard Trustees
3318 Oakcliff Drive
Holladay, Utah 84124
TRUST DEED
THIS TRUST DEED, made effective this 3rd day of March, 1988,
between Commercial Investment Corporation, a Utah corporation, as
TRUSTOR, whose address is 5250 South 300 West, Suite 100, Murray,
Utah 84107, Landmark Title Company,TRUSTEE, and Don Siggard and
Glenna F, Siggard, Trustees, BENEFICIARY,
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN
TRUST, WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property,
situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah:
See legal description attached hereto
and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A."
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon
and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents, issues,
profits, income, tenements, hereditament, privileges and
appurtenances thereunto belonging now or hereafter used or
enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT,
HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to
and conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents,
issues, and profits;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING.
(1) payment of the
indebtedness evidenced by a trust deed note of even date herewith
and all sums due thereunder, in the face amount of $
,
made by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times
and in the manner therein set forth, and any extensions and/or
renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each
agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such
additional loans or advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor,
or its successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note
or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and
(4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary
under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest
thereon as herein provided.
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED:
1. Trustor agrees to comply with all laws, covenants and
restrictions affecting said property; not to commit or permit
waste thereof; not commit, suffer or permit any act upon said
property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the
character or use of said property may be reasonably necessary,
the specific enumerations herein not excluding the general.
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2. Trustor agrees to appear in and defend any action or
proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to
said property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee;
provided, however, that such action or proceeding shall arise
from a person or entity claiming by, through, or under Trustor.
3. Trustor agrees to pay before delinquent all taxes and
assessments affecting said property, including all assessments
upon water company stock and all rents, assessments, charges, and
liens with interest, on said property or any part thereof, which
at any time appear to be prior or superior thereto. Trustor further agree
not to encumber the property, subject to this T. D. with any addit' 1 mort4. Trustor agrees should Trustor fail to make any payment v9ag$
or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or Trustee,*
but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand
upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation
hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to sucty
extent as either may deem necessary to protect the securityhereof; Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon
said property for such purposes; commence, appear in and defend
any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof
or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase,
contest, or compromise any encumbrance, charge or lien which in
the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto.
This paragraph 4, however, does not apply if the claim of a third
party would constitute a breach of the covenants in the Warranty
deed from Beneficiary to Trustor.
5. Trustor agrees to pay immediately and without demand all
sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with simple
interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten percent
(10%) per annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be
secured hereby.
6. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or
damaged by reason of any public improvement or condemnation
proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other
manner, Beneficiary shall be entitled to all compensation,
awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be
entitled as their option to commence, appear in and prosecute in
their own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compromise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage.
All such compensation, awards, damages, rights of action and
proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and
other insurance affecting said property, are hereby assigned by
Beneficiary, who shall apply the same on the indebtedness secured
hereby or to restore or repair the property damaged or otherwise
as directed by Trustor.
7. At any time and from time to time upon written request
of Beneficiary, and after payment of the Trustee's fees and
2
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presentation of this Trust Deed and the Note, without affecting
the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness
secured hereby, Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map
or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any easement or
creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination
or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed or the lien or
charge thereof; (d) reconvey, without warranty, all or any part
of said property. The grantee in any reconveyance may be
described as "the person or persons entitled thereto," and the
recitals therein of any matters or facts shall be conclusive
proof of the truthfulness thereof.
Trustor agrees to pay
reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services mentioned in
this paragraph.
8. As additional security, Trustor hereby assigns to
Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all rents,
issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this
Trust Deed. Unless Trustor executes a separate assignment to
Beneficiary requiring that rents and profits be paid to
Beneficiary, or until Trustor shall default in the payment of any
indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any
agreement hereunder, Trustor shall have the right to collect all
such rents, issues, royalties, and profits earned prior to the
default as they become due and payable. If Trustor shall default
as aforesaid, Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall
cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without
taking possession of the property affected hereto, to collect all
rents, royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or discontinuance
of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time to collect any
such monies shall not in any manner affect the subsequent
enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to
collect the same. Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of
the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed,
to be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or
option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a subordination
of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy,
lease or option.
9. After Beneficiary has given Trustor written notice of
any default by Trustor hereunder and Trustor fails to*cure such
default within thirty (30) days after receipt of such notice,
Beneficiary may, either in person, by agent, or by a receiver to
be appointed by the court (Trustor hereby consenting to the
appointment of a person designated by Beneficiary as such
receiver), enter upon and take possession of said property or any
part thereof, in their own name sue for or otherwise collect said
rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid,
and apply the same upon any indebtedness secured hereby and in
such order as Beneficiary may determine.
10 • The entering upon and taking possession of said
property, the collection of such rents, issues, and profits or
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the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or
compensation or awards for any taking or damage of said property,
and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not
cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or
invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice.
11. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly
enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of such
right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not
constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default.
12.
Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any
indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any
agreement hereunder, Beneficiary shall give Trustor written
notice specifically stating: (1) Trustors1 default(s) (2) That
Trustor shall have 30 days from its receipt of such written
notice within which to cure the default(s); and (3) Beneficiary's
intent to elect either to foreclosure judicially or nonjudicially if Trustor does not cure the default(s) within the
thirty (30) days. Should Trustor fail to cure such default(s)
within the thirty (30) days, then Beneficiary shall give to
Trustor another written notice informing Trustor of its failure
to cure the default(s) and, Beneficiary's election of their
remedy to foreclose either judicially or non-judicially, and that
the entire unpaid balance under the Note is at once due and
payable.
In the event of such default, Beneficiary may elect to
foreclose this Trust Deed under Title 57, Chapter 1 of Utah Code
Ann. (1953, as amended). Beneficiary may also elect to foreclose
this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure
of mortgages on real property.
13. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time
by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of each
county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a
substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution is filed
for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers,
duties, authority and title of the trustee named herein or of any
successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof
made, in the manner provided by law.
14. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit
of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees,
personal representatives, successors, and assigns.
All
obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and several. The term
"Beneficiary11 shall mean the owner and holder, including any
pledgee, of the note secured hereby. In this Trust deed, whenever the context so requires, the masculine gender includes the
feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the
plural.
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15. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly
executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as provided by
law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of
pending sale under any other Trust deed or of any action or
proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a
party, unless brought by Trustee.
16. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the
laws of the State of Utah.
17. Trustor hereby requests that a copy of any notice of
default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to it at
the address hereinbefore set forth.
TRUSTOR:
COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION
By
Its:
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the
day of
, 19 , personally appeared
before me, who being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the
of Commercial Investment Corporation, a Utah
corporation, and that said instrument was signed in behalf of
said corporation in authority of its bylaws (or of a resolution
of its board of directors, as the case may be), and said
, acknowledged to me that said corporation
executed the same.
Notary Public
Residing at _
My commission expires:
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EXHIBIT "D"

TRUST DEED NOTE
$

Salt Lake City, Utah
Effective March 3, 1988
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned promises to pay to the

order of Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, Trustees, at 3318
Oakcliff Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84124, or at such other
place as the holder hereof may designate,
Dollars ($

), together with

interest from date at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum on
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as
follows:
Annual interest payments beginning March 3, 1989
and continuing on the 3rd day of each succeeding March
thereafter until March 3, 1998 at which time the entire
unpaid principal shall be fully paid.
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and
the balance to the reduction of principal.

Holders agree to

cause the Trustee under the Trust Deed to partially reconvey
their Trust Deed on the Property upon principal payment under
this Note of $35,000.00 per acre.

Maker may make such request

and designate which acreage is to be reconveyed at any such time
as Maker makes any principal payments hereunder.
This Ntote is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith.
COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT
a Utah corporation
By
Its

CORPORATION,
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March 5 ,

1990

Commercial Investment Corp,
5295 So. 300 West
Murray, Ut. 84107

To whom it may concern,
To comply with section Eighteen-A with the contract between
Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard to commercial investment
Corporation dated August 31, 1989, we submit this notice of
buyers default in annual option payment of Fifty Six Thousand
^Dollars ($56,000.00) as of March 3, 1990.
Buyer has thirty
days from receipt of this notice to cure the default.

Don Siggard
3165 Fur Hollow Dr,
Sandy, Utah 84093

Please note address change
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Commercial Investment
5295 So. 3rd West
Murray, Utah 84107

Corp •

April 3, 1990

Commercial Investment Corp,
In compliance to section 18-A of the contract with Don & c enna
Siggard and the Commercial Investment Corp. dated Augur
31,
1988, we submit this second letter of buyers default in
compliance to the agreement in the contract. Since, the default
notified in the first letter mailed March 5, 1990 was not cured,
rt * ipt of this letter releases seller of all obligations to
the original contract with Commercial Investment Corp* dated
August 31, 1988.

CC: DS/ks

00018

fc.-;jfcSt" '-•
~

-••• v ,:?

j - ; . - . * - . •

p sm i&b •n?
RECEIPT FOR CERTIFIED MAIL
NO INSUMNCi C0VUA8E HKMOED
NOT m*. WTOWATK*AL HAIL

~-om

3LSCH ZZFP 501 2S3 3S*3.

WHEN RECORDEP PLEASE MAIL TOi
i m e r c i a l I n v e s t m e n t Corp.
/O Busch C o r p o r a t i o n
o b e r t Busch
295 South 320 West #510
LC, Utah 84107

-u3

^

00019

^

NOTICE OF INTCRES

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
The undersigned hereby give notice of an interest claimed with
respect to certain real property located in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, particularly described as follows, to-wit:
The Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 20,
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

Township 3

EXCEPTING TIICRErROM the followmgi
BEGINNING North 0° 07 • 30" West
1327.82 feet from the South quarter corner of Section 20; and running
thence North 0°07'30" West 180.84 feet; thence North 89°52'30 M East
456 feet; thene South 0° 07'30" East 183.58 feet more or less; thence
North 89°46 , 51 M West 456 feet more or less to the point of 3CGINNING.

Krcjuust of LANDMARK TITLE COMPANY
KATIE L DIXON, nor order
Silt Lako County, Utah

«-2£

Entry N o . i i ^ J O ^

COURTESY RECORDING
This document Is being recorded solely • • *
courtesy and an accomodation to th9 oartlM
named therein. LANOMARK TITLE COMPANY

SJ!S

lccu,lcy or tht

*™«*

DATEDi April 4, 1990

'Ayfi^r'
Robert R. Busch. President

STATE OP UTAH
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE

)
) SS.
)

19 90
On the
4th
day of
AprU
appeared before me
p^H* r » a wti«f»hJ priti<<in» ftf r^mm^rr^jil TnvflBfmunt
Cnrnnrntinn
the signer(s) of the foregoing i n s t r u m e n t , w h o duly acknowledged
executed the
the same.
to mil that
ho

Icftary P u b l i c
No
Residing att SLC, Utah
My Commission Expiresi 07/90

«HEN RECORDED PLEASE MAIL TOt
"v»*rciaJ Investment Corp.
C/o Husch Corporation
ftobart Butch
W 9 5 South 320 Watt
1510
• l.C, Utah 84107

NOTICE Of INTEREST
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KNOW ALL HEN BY THESE PRESENTS!
The undersigned
hartby give notlca of Mt\ interest claimed with
respect to certain raai property
located
in Salt
Lake County,
State of Utah, particularly described at follows, to-witi

n
Irt

•H
S?
^

The Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 20, Township 3,
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
EXCEPTING THEREFROH th« foliowingi
BEGINNING North 0° 07'30' Watt
1327.82 feat from tha South quartar corner of Saction 20; and running
thenca North 0°07'30" Heat 180.64 f^•t# thence North 89°52 , 30 B 2aat
4S6 feati thane South 0° 07'30* East
13.36 feat mora or less; thence
North 8 9 ° 4 e , M ' West 456 feat mora or last to tha point of BEGINNING.

crvtmriYnsco^otNQ
Th!tdc:vm'Ml
.. i
edooietyata
oouflev * . .»i
... •
•«> ,i>c rv-tjea
ntrwr ih4 „#, lAf'O-^rj.. I*MU:C:C •: , v/v
htfufcy o #t%%'.j o-e- Xr. i v.y roipor.tlcll'ty
or flawUry for tna accuracy or tha como.it
thereof.

DATEDi A p r i l

4.

lt»0

ftT^OypRATION

Robert W. B u t c h ,

8TATI OF U1AH
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE

Praaldant

)
) it.
)

011

/

19 fo . personally
**•
4 th
day of
Aarll
appeared before a» _m
• lofttft > .RusrJi, . fraattlanf ,nr Cnmmarrla} InvasfinaLf fnrnnrar Inn .
^ w ' l l j o e r ( e ) of the foregoing instrvment,who duly acknowledged
J*..hCy**t
he
executed the same.
.

ILC, Utah
ion Ixpiren
07/90

mi

t ocnm

*se#/ctio
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CORBRIDGE. B A I R D & C H R I S T E N S E N
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
215 SOUTH STATE
SUTTE 800

SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8 4 1 1 1
LAWRENCE E. OORBRIDGE
JOHN KNAPP BAIRD
JAMES L. CHRISTENSEN
RICHARD C TERRY
PAUL IX NEWTON
MARK J MORRISE
MICHAEL LEE
TAMAR & JERGENSEN

TELEPHONE
(80 It 534-0909
TELECOPIER
(801) 534-1048

A p r i l 4,

1990

Via Mail, Certified Mail, Hand-Deliverv
Mr. Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, Trustees
3165 Fur Hollow Drive
Sandy, UT 84093
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Siggard:
I have been retained by Commercial Investment Corporation to
respond to your letters dated March 5, 1990, and April 3, 1990.
In reviewing your notices and Commercial Investment Corporation's
file I note the following deficiencies:
1.
The Amendment executed by Commercial Investment
Corporation on March 30, 1989, has not been executed by Glenna F.
Siggard, trustee;
2.
Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, trustees under the
Don and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust Agreement have not sent
any notices required under paragraph 18 of the Real Estate
Contract;
3.

The April 3, 1990, notice was sent two days premature.

For the above stated reasons, both the March 5, 1990 letter
and the April 3, 1990 letter are deficient. You are hereby put
on notice that Commercial Investment Corporation will not
recognize any notices in connection with the Real Estate Contract
executed on August 31, 1988, unless they are executed by both Don
Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, trustees. Moreover, Commercial
Investment Corporation hereby requests the return of the
Amendment dated March 30, 1989, with the original signatures of
both Don Siggard, trustee, and Glenna F. Siggard, trustee.
As you know, Commercial Investment Corporation has obtained
commercial zoning and site plan approval from Sandy City.
Pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Real Estate Contract, you were
required to obtain and provide Commercial Investment Corporation
with a certified ALTA survey which you have failed to do. You
are hereby put on notice of your breach under paragraph 12 of the
Real Estate Contract and requested to deliver the ALTA survey
immediately.

00022
Don and Glenna Siggard
April 5, 1990
Page 2

This letter shall serve as the written notice required under
paragraph 3 of the Real Estate Contract that Commercial
Investment Corporation will be ready to select a mutually
convenient date for the execution and delivery of the Warranty
Deed, Trust Deed and Note after receiving the survey.
Commercial Investment Corporation also requests evidence of
full payment of all taxes and assessments against the property as
required under paragraph 14 of the Real Estate Contract prior to
the exchange of the Warranty Deed, Trust Deed and Note.
Thank you for your attention in this matter.
I expect
prompt response with regard to delivery of the executed Amendment
ALTA survey, and proof of payment of taxes.
Sincerely,
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN

mes L. Christensen
Attorney at Law
JLC/amj
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Randall N. Skanchy (USB #2968)
Scott D. Cheney (USB #6198)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendants
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
James L. Christensen, (USB #0639)
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-0909
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,

PRETRIAL ORDER

vs.
DON SIGGARD AND GLENNA F.
SIGGARD, as Trustees for the Don Siggard
and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust,
Defendants.

121647.3

Case No. 920904431CV
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki
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This matter came before the Court on July 17, 1995, at a Pre-Trial Conference
held pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure before the Honorable
Glenn K. Iwasaki, Third District Court Judge. Randall N. Skanchy and Scott D. Cheney of
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough appeared as counsel for the Defendants, Don and
Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust, Don and Glenna F. Siggard Trustees (the "Siggards").
James L. Christensen of Corbridge, Baird and Christensen, appeared as counsel for Plaintiff,
Commercial Investment Corporation ("CIC"). The following action was taken:
1.

JURISDICTION. This is an action for specific performance of a real estate

contract for the sale of real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah, with the Siggards
asserting counterclaims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, wrongful lien, breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and for intentional interference with
prospective economic relations. Jurisdiction of the Court is thus invoked under Utah Code
Ann. Section 78-3-4 and is not disputed. The Court determined its jurisdiction to be present.
2.

VENUE. Venue is laid by CIC in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

Section 78-13-1. The Court determined such venue to be proper.
3.

GENERAL NATURE OF THE PARTIES' CLAIMS,
(1)

Commercial Investment Corporation's Claims:
a. Breach of Contract. CIC has sued for breach of the Real Estate
Contract, claiming the following breaches: Siggard declared the
contract in default, having already breached the contract first and

121647.3
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without complying with the notice requirements of the contract; Siggard
failed to timely provide an ALTA survey; Siggard refused to allow
plaintiff to designate its desired acreage; and Siggard refused to honor
the terms of the contract. CIC pleaded both rescission and specific
performance as potential remedies for the alleged breach.
b. Specific Performance. CIC pleaded as a separate cause of action
Specific Performance of the contract based on the alleged breaches of
contract by the defendants. CIC elected Specific Performance as its
chosen remedy by motion to the court dated January 25, 1995.
c. Relinquished Claims.
(i) Unjust Enrichment. CIC alleged in count two of the First Amended
Complaint that the Siggards were unjustly enriched by CIC's
development efforts on the property including engineering, planning and
the obtaining of commercial zoning for a portion of the property. CIC
also alleged the Siggards were unjustly enriched by retaining their
property without paying CIC adequate compensation. This claim was
relinquished by CIC in its election of specific performance as its remedy
in its motion and memorandum dated January 25, 1995.
(ii) Rescission. CIC claimed it was entitled under the contract to
rescind the contract and receive all payments made by CIC to Siggards
121647.3
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in the event of breach of the contract by the Siggards. This claim is
also relinquished by CIC's election of specific performance as its
remedy dated January 25, 1995.
Siggards' Defenses:
a. Breach of Contract
(i)

The Real Estate Contract is voidable for lack of consideration

and is unconscionable.
(ii)

CIC breached the contract by failing to make the down payment,

by failing to make annual interest payments under its terms, by failing to
designate property to be surveyed, thereby rendering performance by
Siggards impossible, and by placing a Notice of Interest on the
Siggards' property.
(iii)

CIC's claim for specific performance fails because of CIC's

failure to make a sufficient tender.
(iv)

CIC's claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.

(v)

CIC failed to mitigate its alleged damages.

(vi)

CIC's claims are barred by waiver and estoppel in that CIC

waived its right to claim a lack of a survey for its failure to designate
the property to be surveyed.

4
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b. Unjust Enrichment
(i)

This claim is negated by virtue of CIC's election of specific

performance of the contract as its chosen remedy.
(ii)

Siggards have not been enriched due to any act of CIC.

c. Specific Performance
(i)

CIC has not tendered specific performance and is unable to

tender specific performance.
(ii)

CIC has unclean hands.

(iii)

CIC breached the contract by failing to make the down payment,
by failing to make annual interest payments under its terms, by
failing to designate the property to be surveyed, thereby
rendering performance by Siggards impossible, and by placing a
Notice of Interest on the Siggards' property.

d. Rescission
(i)

CIC's election of specific performance as its remedy negates this

claim.
(ii)

CIC breached the contract by failing to make the down payment,

by failing to make annual interest payments under its terms, by failing to
designate the property to be surveyed, thereby rendering performance by

121647.3
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Siggards impossible, and by placing a Notice of Interest on the
Siggards' property.
Siggards' Counterclaims:
a. Breach of Express Contract. CIC breached the express terms of the
Real Estate Contract by failing to make required annual interest
payments, failing to make the initial down payment, by failing to
designate the property to be surveyed and encumbering the real property
by filing a Notice of Interest on the subject property.
b. Unjust Enrichment. CIC would be unjustly enriched if it received
the property without making the down payment, without making the
required interest payments and by encumbering all of the Siggards'
property, despite having claim to only a portion of the subject property.
CIC would also be unjustly enriched if it is allowed to receive the
benefit of several years of unprecedented increase in the value of the
land without making some reasonable compensation for such increase in
the value of the land.
c. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. CIC's
failure to perform the contract, its refusal to designate the property to be
surveyed and its very entering into the Real Estate Contract without the
ability to perform the contract was in bad faith and constitutes a breach
6
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of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the Real Estate
Contract.
d. Wrongful Lien. CIC's filing of a Notice of Interest encumbering the
entire thirty-eight (38) acres of the Siggards' property while having a
claim to only sixteen acres constitutes a wrongful lien on the Siggards'
property.
e. Interference with Prospective Economic Relations. CIC filed the
Notice of Interest with the improper purpose, causing interference in the
Siggards' prospective economic relations regarding the property.
4.

UNCONTROVERTED FACTS. The following facts are established by

admissions in the pleadings or by stipulation of counsel:
a.

CIC is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Salt

Lake County, Utah.
b.

The Defendants Don and Glenna F. Siggard are trustees of the Don and

Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust, a beneficial trust created under the laws of Utah.
c.

At all times relevant to this action, Robert Busch was president of CIC.

d.

On August 31, 1989, the parties entered into a real estate contract (the

"contract") for the sale and purchase of twenty (20) acres of a thirty-eight (38) acre parcel
located in Sandy, Utah, owned by the Siggard Family Trust.

121647.3
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e.

The contract required and acknowledged the deposit of a down payment

by CIC to Landmark Title Company, although the actual payment of the down payment is
disputed.
f.

The contract also required, among other things, that CIC make annual

interest payments of ten percent (10%) per annum on the balance due to the Siggards on
March 3 of each year until 1998, in the event the contract was not rescinded.
g.

The first annual interest payment was due March 3, 1989, unless the

contract was rescinded.
h.

The Siggards did not receive the first annual interest payment on or

before March 3, 1989.
i.

On March 5, 1989, the Siggards sent notice of default to CIC requiring

CIC to make the payment within 30 days, and CIC received the notice.
j.

CIC paid the first annual interest payment of $56,000.00 on March 30,

1989, within the required 30 days, after receiving notice of default.
k.

On March 30, 1989, the parties entered an Amendment to the Real

Estate Contract, changing, among other things, the acreage to be sold and purchased from
twenty (20) to sixteen (16) acres.
1.

On August 22, 1989, the Sandy City Commission entered Ordinance

89-33 rezoning 10 acres of the Siggards' property to Special District Neighborhood
Commercial (SD CN).
121647 3
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m.

The Siggards did not obtain nor deliver a survey to CIC within 45 days

of August 22, 1989, but did obtain and deliver a survey of the entire 38 acre parcel of
property to CIC in June 1994.
n.

CIC did not pay, nor did the Siggards receive the annual interest

payment that was due on March 3, 1990.
o.

On March 5, 1990, the Siggards mailed a notice of default of the

contract to CIC; CIC received this notice on March 6, 1990.
p.

CIC did not make the annual interest payment.

q.

On April 3, 1990, the Siggards again notified CIC of its alleged default

and its failure to cure, and declared themselves released of the obligations under the contract;
CIC received this notice on April 3, 1990.
r.

On April 4, 1990, CIC filed a Notice of Interest claiming an interest in

all thirty-eight (38) acres of the Siggards' property.
s.

On April 4, 1990, CIC sent a letter to the Siggards claiming default by

the Siggards and demanding delivery of an ATLA survey and requiring proof of payment of
taxes.
t.

CIC did not have, in 1990, nor has it ever had, a bank account in its

name.
5.

CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT. Contested issues of fact remaining for

decision are:
121647.3
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a.

Except as designated as uncontested above, all factual matters relevant

to the questions of law or fact listed below.
b.

Who drafted the contract.

c.

Whether plaintiff made the down payment, and whether such payment

was deposited with Landmark Title.
d.

Whether plaintiff was ready, willing and able to perform the contract in

1990, and today.
e.

Whether and when Siggards received notice of the rezoning of 10 acres.

f.

Whether the Siggards refused to allow CIC to designate the acres it

would buy and otherwise refused to comply with the terms of the contract prior to March 3,
1990.
g.

Whether Siggard complied with the forfeiture and notice provisions of

h.

Whether plaintiff has incurred any damages.

L

Whether CIC ever tendered its full performance of the contract.

j.

Whether CIC had, in 1990, or at any other time, any assets other than

the contract.

the Real Estate Contract.
k.
6.

Whether CIC ever designated the property to be surveyed.

CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW. The contested issues of law, in addition to

those implicit in the foregoing issues of fact, are:
121647.3
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a.

Whether the contract is enforceable.

b.

Whether Siggards breached the contract, and when.

c.

Whether encumbering all 38 acres of Siggards' property constitutes a

d.

Whether CIC breached the contract.

e.

Whether CIC is entitled to specific performance, and if so, whether CIC

wrongful lien.

owes any interest to date and whether the contract performance dates should be extended.
f.

Whether CIC breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

g.

Whether CIC tendered its full performance under the contract and

whether CIC is excused from that tender.
h.

The measure of Siggards' damages, if any.

i.

Whether Siggard was required to comply with the forfeiture and notice

provisions of the contract.
j.

Whether plaintiff intentionally interfered with Siggards' prospective

economic relations.
k.

Whether CIC has the duty to mitigate when it is not seeking damages.

1.

Whether Siggards are entitled to attorneys' fees as a measure of their

damages as a result of CIC's alleged breach of the contract and of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing or under any other statutory or legal basis.

121647.3
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7.

EXHIBITS. The following documents are expected trial exhibits of the

parties:
a.

The parties have agreed and stipulated to the admission of the exhibits

as listed in the attached Trial Exhibit list.
b.

Plaintiffs' proposed trial exhibits are listed in Appendix "A" attached

hereto and incorporated herein.
c.

Defendant's proposed trial exhibits are listed in Appendix "B" attached

hereto and incorporated herein.
d.

The parties will file a stipulation as to which exhibits may be admitted

into evidence within seven (7) days of trial.
e.

The parties shall exchange copies of their proposed trial exhibits within

seven (7) days of trial.
f.

If other exhibits are to be offered and their necessity can be reasonably

anticipated, they will be designated in a writing filed with the Court and submitted to
opposing counsel at least three (3) days prior to trial.
8.

WITNESSES. Except with respect to rebuttal witnesses, if any:
a.

In the absence of reasonable notice to opposing counsel to the contrary,

CIC will call the following persons as witnesses: Bob Busch, Andrew Walton, Bailey
Butters, the Siggards, Gary Free, Ken Dyer, Mike Coulam, George Shaw, and Gil Avillar.
CIC may call Greg Hales, Barbara Busch, and an engineer or surveyor.
121647 3
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CIC may use the depositions of Don Siggard, Bob Busch, Andy Walton, Mike
Coulam, George Shaw, and Gil Avillar.
b.

In the absence of reasonable notice to opposing counsel to the contrary,

defendants, the Siggards, will call the following persons as witnesses: Don and Glenna
Siggard, Jeff Jensen, David Van Drimmelen, Michael Aldrich and Richard Sorensen.
Defendants may call the following persons as witnesses: Mike Coulam, Mike Holmes and
Gil Avillar.
Defendants may use the depositions of Don Siggard, Andrew Walton, Robert
Busch, Mike Coulam, George Shaw, and Gil Avillar.
c.

In the event other witnesses are to be called at trial, a statement of their

names and addresses and the general subject matter of their testimony will be served upon
opposing counsel at least seven (7) days prior to trial. This restriction shall not apply to
rebuttal witnesses, the necessity of whose testimony reasonably cannot be anticipated before
the time of trial.
9.

MATTERS TO BE RESOLVED. Prior to commencement of trial briefing,

the following matters remain to be resolved by the court:

10.

a.

Appraisals — to be exchanged by July 21, 1995.

b.

Motions in Limine — to be argued on August 1, 1995, at 9:00 a.m.

REQUEST FOR INSTRUCTIONS, Requests for voir dire examination of

the jury and request for instructions to the jury shall be exchanged and submitted to the
121647.3
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Court by August 2, 1995. Counsel may supplement requested instructions during trial on
matters that were not reasonably anticipated prior to trial. Proposed written questions for
submission to the jury for the return of a special verdict, pursuant to Rule 49 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, shall be submitted to the Court at the same time as the request for
instructions to the jury.
11.

AMENDMENTS TO THE PLEADINGS. The Court allowed CIC to amend

the Complaint to add a claim for specific performance. CIC submitted its First Amended
Complaint on July 30, 1993.
12.

DISCOVERY. Discovery has been completed except for the interviewing or

deposition of witnesses which must be completed by July 27, 1995.
13.

TRIAL SETTING. The case was set for a three-day jury trial to commence

on August 1, 1995, at 9:00 o'clock a.m. at Room 301, 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah.
14.

POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT. The possibility of settlement is

considered fair.

121647.3
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DATED this

f
day of July, 1995.
BY THE COU

The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki
Third Judicial District Court Judge
Prior to execution by the Court, the foregoing Pretrial Order is hereby adopted this
day of July, 1995.
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN

;s L. Christensen
irneys for Plaintiff
Commercial Investment Corporation

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH

Randall N.llcarichy-^
Scott D. Cheney
Attorneys for Defendants
Don and Glenna F. Siggard

121647.3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

'•>••

y{"

day of July, 1995, I caused to be hand delivered, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing PRETRIAL ORDER to:

James L. Christensen
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

121647.3

16

00039

TRIAL EXHIBIT INDEX

1.

Earnest Money Sales Agreement, March 3, 1988.

2.

Promissory Note, March 3, 1988.

3.

Site Plan (Exhibit A), April 19, 1988.

4.

Letter to Allen McCandless from Bailey Butters, April 20, 1988 with
accompanying letter of April 20, 1988, property plat, legal description.

5.

Commitment for Title Insurance, June 7, 1988.

6.

Amended Commitment for Title Insurance, August 31, 1988.

7.

Real Estate Contract, August 31, 1988.

8.

Site Plan, November 8, 1988.

9.

Letter to Allen McCandless from Bailey Butters, dated November 22, 1988.

10.

Memo from Planning Department to Planning Commission and City Council, dated
November 23, 1988.

11.

Sandy City Zone change documents (See Appendix A-1, 57 separate documents).

12.

February 1989 Busch Comments with Regard to Stipulations from Crescent Village
Citizens Committee.

13.

Sandy City Zoning Ordinance #89-2, #89-33, January 10, 1989.

14.

Sandy City Zoning Ordinance #89-33.

15.

§ 15-29-27, Sandy City Development Code.

16.

Notice of Buyer's Default, March 6, 1989.

17.

Amendment to Real Estate Contract, March 30, 1989.

18.

$56,000 check stub of Busch Properties, Inc. dated March 30, 1989.

121647.3
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19.

Memo from Phil Glenn to Councilmen, Andy Walton and others, dated June 15,
1989.

20.

Notice of Buyers Default, March 5, 1990 and certified mail return receipts.

21.

Notice of Forfeiture of Buyers, April 3, 1990 and certified mail return receipts.

22.

Notice of Interest, April 4, 1990.

23.

Letter to Siggards from Christensen, April 4, 1990.

24.

Handwritten note of Don Siggard, April 22, 1992.

25.

Earnest Money Sales Agreement from Woodside Homes, Inc., September 14,
1992.

26.

Earnest Money Sales Agreement from Perry & Associates, Inc., December 10,
1992.

27.

December 7, 1993 Letter from Michael L. Aldrich to Randy Coke.

28.

Sorensen ALTA Property Survey, June, 1994.

29.

Drawings of legal descriptions for zoned property: April 20, 1988, November 8,
1988, Ordinance 89-33, Site Plan 1994.

30.

CIC Appraisals.

31.

Siggard Appraisal.

32.

Site Plan Review Chapter 15-22 Site Plan Review.

33.

Time Line of Events.

34.

Property Tax Evaluations for 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995.

35.

Planning Commission Application dated September 20, 1994.

36.

Sandy City Site Plan Review Procedures and Standards.

37.

Site Plans, September 13, 1994.

121647.3
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APPENDIX A

PLAINTIFFS ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS

1.

CIC Timeline.

2.

Aerial Photograph of Property.

3.

Cash Receipts #310916 and 310917 dated September 20, 1994.

4.

Subdivision or Site Plan Review Fees Form, September 14, 1994.

5.

Application for Conditional Use Permit, September 20, 1994.

6.

Update Market Analysis for Retail/Commercial Development - 11300 South 1000
East for Gardner and Associates by Leffler & Associates, September, 1994.

7.

Letter to Sandy City Planning Commission from Bill Peperone, September 20,
1994.

8.

Legal Description.

9.

Letter to Sandy City Planning Department from Commercial Investment Corp.,
September 29, 1994.

10.

Letter to Sandy City from Commercial Investment Corp., October 3, 1994.

11.

Memorandum to Greg Hales from Bill Peperone, October 3, 1994.

12.

Memorandum of Kathy Jeffery, Deputy City Attorney from Bill Peperone,
October 25, 1994.

13.

Sandy City Meeting Minutes, October 25, 1994.

14.

Commitment for Title Insurance, January 30, 1995.

15.

Certificate of Deposit for $56,000 in the name of Commercial Investment
Corporation.

121647.3
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APPENDIX B

DEFENDANTS' ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS
September 8, 1992 letter from Randy Coke to Jim Christensen.
September 14, 1994 letter to Jim Christensen from Jones, Waldo, Holbrook &
McDonough.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

000 4 A

In order to forfeit a purchaser's interest under a reai estate contract, the seller must
comply strictly with the notice provisions of the contract.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

43

0004 1

WRONGFUL LIEN - GROUNDLESS
The wrongful lien statute provides that a person who files a document can be held liable
for a wrongful lien if the person knows or haSv reason to know that the document is
"groundless".
A document is groundless only if the interest claimed in the document has no arguable
basis or is not supported by any credible evidence.
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SPECIAL VERDICT
:

DON SIGGARD AND GLENNA F.
:
SIGGARD, as "Trustees for the Don Siggard:
and Glenna F. Siggard Family Tin ist.
:
Defendants
:

Case No. 920904431CV
.Judge Glenn K Iwasaki

MEMBERS i I- Mil (URV
Please answer 'the following questions based on your determination of whether the fact
in question has been established by a preponderance of the evidence. If you

. that the

evidence si lpports a gn e n fact 1: •] a preponderance > c i i should answer the questions as to that
"Yes " If, on the other hand, if you find that the evidence as to a given fact is so equally
balantt'tl lllial I,IIII i .IIIIIIIIIIIIII I ilctnmini1 Ilk pi^pondtrana 1 nl lb; i \ idenu m ill ' m Illiiiiiiil! llli.ii line
evidence preponderates against the fact presented, answer the question as to that fact

• "

Some questions have already been niailed foi you based upon Hie stipulation of the panics..
1.

tVas the contract between Commercial Investment Corporation and the Siggards

a valid contract?
_ I
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No

00046
2.

Did Commercial Investment Corporation fail to fully tender its performance

and perform all of its contractual obligations according to the terms of the Contract including
the timely payment of all amounts due?
X Yes
3.

Na

Was Commercial Investment Corporation excused from tendering its

performance and from performing its contractual obligations including its annual interest
payment obligations?
Yes
4.

\

No

,v

Is Commercial Investment Corporation/precluded} from asserting that it is

excused from failing to perform its obligations by any one of the following: a) estoppel,b

)

waiver, and/or c) unclean hands?
5.

Is Commercial Investment Corporation entitled to specific performance of the

Real Estate Contract?
Yes
6.

No

J(

Did the Siggards perform all steps necessary to forfeit Commercial Investment

Corporation's interest in the contract?
JL

7.

Yes

No

Was the Notice of Interest filed by Commercial Investment Corporation in

violation of Utah Wrongful Lien Statute?

_X Yes
8.

N

°

Did Commercial Investment Corporation breach the Real Estate Contract?
2 1 Yes

No
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Considering only the evidence concerning damages, and without being
* "mey would

fairly and adequately compensate the Siggards for actual damages suffered by them proximately
caused by the filing of the Notice of Interest?
Amount: "|i

/ "'"

The foregoing answers agreed upon, signed and returned to the Court this j ^ _ ^ _ day

)
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Randall N. Skanchy (USB #2968)
Scott D. Cheney (USB #6198)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaim
Plaintiffs Don and Glenna F. Siggard

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT CORP.
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

T V " ~Vv *V->-' * v , " ^ - <

<5c.

vs.
DON SIGGARD AND GLENNA F.
SIGGARD, as Trustees for the Don Siggard
and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust,

Case No. 920904431CV
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 58A(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Judgment is hereby
entered upon the verdict of the jury, the trial of this matter having come before the Court on
Tuesday, August 1, 1995, for jury trial, the jury being duly constituted and the trial proceeding
August 1, 2, 3 and 4, plaintiff and counterclaim defendant Commercial Investment Corporation
having been represented by James L. Christensen and Mark J. Morrise of the law firm
Corbridge, Baird & Christensen, and defendants and counterclaim plaintiffs Don Siggard and
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Glenna F. Siggard, as Trustees for the Don Siggard

..*

Siggard Family "1'rust

("Siggards"), ti'i\'iiit» bn/iiii ir|iirs(Mited by Randall N Skanch] and Scott I). Cheney of the law
firm ol Jones, Waldo Holbrook & McDonough.
evidence, the testimon

The jurv, having carefully considered the

vilnesses, aiguiiiuil Iby * niinsol Jiud luiviiijj, iiieecivcd I;

•

s,

jury instructions, and the special verdict, and the Court having received the jury's completed
special verdict which found as follows:
... (i)

I he contract between Commercial Investment Corporation and the

Siggards was a \a- o ..oniracf

(This finding was stipulated to by the parties prior to

submission
(ii)

mestment

performance am. . . ....i;., .

Corporation 'failed to fully

tender its

... contractual obligations according to the terms of

the Contract including the timely payments of all amounts due (this finding was
stipulated, to by the parties prior to submission to the jury); and
(1111
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its performance and from performing its contractual obligations including its annual
interest pa>i .,

.,;,.:.;., and

(u

wiwial Investment Corporation is not allowed to assert; that it was

excused from failii ig to perh-rn
a) estoppel. '

—•

.
iurcu :

, obligations by any one of the following:
! in hands.

imestmeni 1 Mporaiii

perf*-;,, JJ.
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(vi)

The Siggards performed all steps necessary to forfeit Commercial

Investment Corporation's interest in the contract; and
(vii)

The Notice of Interest was filed by Commercial Investment Corporation

in violation of Utah Wrongful Lien Statute; and
(viii) Commercial Investment Corporation breached the Real Estate Contract;
and
(ix)

Considering only the evidence concerning damages, and without being

concerned with the fault of any party in answering this question, what amount of
money would fairly and accurately compensate the Siggards for actual damages
suffered by them proximately caused by the filing of the Notice of Interest?
Amount: $

-0-

Based upon the findings of the jury and the stipulations of the parties, the Court enters
the following Judgment:
1.

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint for Specific Performance is dismissed with

2.

Siggards' Counterclaims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of

prejudice;

good faith and fair dealing are hereby granted, the Real Estate Contract is hereby made null and
void, and Commercial Investment Corporation's interest in any and all real property under the
Real Estate Contract is forfeited; and
3.

Siggards' Counterclaim for Wrongful Lien, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 38-9-1

is hereby granted and, because no actual damages were offered at trial or found by the jury, the
134285 3
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statutory penalty of $1,000 Is hereby entered of record, with a memorandum of costs and

DATED this / ( /

day of August, 1995.

^Tlonorable Glenn,,, K Iwas,
District Judge
Approved as to Form:
HIRBRlDGh, BAIRD & ( iIKISTHNSI-iN

By.
James L. Christensen
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Counterclaim Defendant
Commercial Investment Corporation

JONES, WAT JV ", ! V M HUC H )K ,V M,- i M W )\ '< III

By_

Randall N. Skanchy
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaim
Plaintiffs Don and Glenna " \\vsdut ,^
Trustees of the Don Sigurd and (Henna P.
Siggard Family Tn ,c '
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